While
Churchill was thus engaged Grey had, in the meantime, proposed a joint
representation by the Entente Powers to Venizelos guaranteeing to support Greece
as an ally if Turkey joined Germany and Austria, and had hinted again that
concessions might have to be made to Bulgaria. However, before this
communication could be delivered, the Russian Minister in Athens learned that
his Government was now insisting on Greek concessions.
Elliot cabled Grey on 2 September that, in his opinion, Greece would refuse
‘because neither King of Greece nor public opinion would consent to such
concessions.’
Although Venizelos was determined not to be the stumbling block he had, however,
to perform a delicate balancing act: how to reconcile his desperation to join
the Entente against Turkey with his anxiety not to be associated with the loss
of Greek territory to Bulgaria to guarantee the support of the Powers. Venizelos
repeated his fears through the pliant Elliot on the 4th by arguing that
Bulgarian mobilization would paralyse the scope for movement of the Greek army,
while adding hopefully that, if inducements had to be made to Bulgaria, they
should be in the form of Turkish territory — a suggestion the Russians were
hardly likely to agree to, nor Grey for that matter keen as he was to keep the
Turks neutral.
The irreconcilable problem for Venizelos was
that the Greek army simply was not strong enough to mount a campaign against
Turkey yet retain sufficient forces to be able to guarantee that the Bulgarians
could be held in check. As Admiral Kerr was later to remark, the logical result
of what Venizelos was proposing would be to send the Greek Army to Gallipoli and
substitute for them Allied troops in Greece to match the Bulgarians.
Kerr had been in the Aegean long enough to formulate his own ideas as to how to
attack Turkey; whereas Admiral Condouriotis believed the Greek navy could
go up the Dardanelles, Kerr disagreed. In June 1914, when war with Turkey had
seemed imminent over the islands’ question, Kerr had been instructed by the
Greek Minister of Marine to prepare a plan for a naval attack against the Turks.
His report was uncompromising: ‘The British Fleet, backed by all the other
navies in the world, cannot force the passage of the Dardanelles. This must be a
military operation, assisted by the Navy.’ Turkish torpedo-tube installations
and mines protected by shore batteries could only be neutralized by troops
holding the Gallipoli Peninsula, allowing the mines to be swept unhindered.
Holding these views, Kerr immediately went to
work and prepared an ambitious plan involving a five-pronged attack: while
20,000 troops would capture and hold Alexandretta (at which point the railway
passes close to the coast) to cut off Turkish supplies from the south-east,
30,000 men would land at Aivali to pin down the Smyrna Army Corps and prevent
them from going north to reinforce the Dardanelles’ defences; 2,000 men would
land on the Asiatic side of the Dardanelles to take the fort there (Kum Kale)
from the rear and use its gun against the other fortifications; 30,000 troops
were to occupy Bulair, at the narrowest point of the Gallipoli Peninsula, to
isolate the Peninsula and prevent reinforcements arriving from Constantinople;
and, finally, the main thrust would be delivered by 80,000 troops who would land
near Gaba Tepe and neutralize the forts there. Estimates for the number of
troops varied from 142,000 to 162,000
— but as the Greek army numbered 180,000 fully equipped, an expeditionary force
would leave insufficient men to face the threat posed by Bulgaria’s army of
350,000.
King Constantine’s solution to this dilemma
was for Greece to remain neutral and await a Turkish attack which he considered
appeared a remote possibility. Venizelos likewise had nothing to fear from a
Turkish attack and assured Elliot on this point; the Greek General Staff also
remained unconvinced as to the probability of a Turkish land attack for,
assuming the co-operation of Bulgaria, which was doubtful, it would take the
Turks 17 days, marching through Bulgarian territory, just to reach the Greek
frontier. It was also thought likely that German interests would exert a
restraining influence on the Porte.
This apparent insouciance was not, however, widely shared: Mallet issued a
warning from Constantinople on 5 September that, though the Turkish fleet would
not enter the Aegean, the ‘danger point is an attack on Greece by land.’
Similarly, the Russian Ambassador at Constantinople also forwarded to Petrograd
his opinion that Turkey was on the point of attacking Greece ostensibly because
of the failure of Greece to make concessions with regard to the disputed islands
at the Bucharest conference. Sazonov was convinced that, in that eventuality,
Bulgaria would participate in a Turkish attack unless she could be bought off by
the promise of Greek territorial concessions. Fully committed against the
Germans in the north, Sazonov warned Buchanan that he had no desire ‘to allow
Greece to drag Russia into a war with Turkey and unless she listened to our
advice he would disinterest himself in her altogether.’ The position was clear:
Greece had to square Bulgaria or ‘bear the brunt of the war single-handed.’
Doubtful as to the apparent lack of concern
shown by the Greeks, Elliot warned Grey that it was ‘highly desirable to let
Turkey know that if she attacks Greece we shall support the latter. This would
do more than anything to keep Turkey quiet.’ Elliot further reported that, with
regard to Bulgaria, Venizelos maintained that he had received ‘positive
assurances of definite neutrality’ from Sofia but, like the Turco-German
alliance, he chose to disbelieve them — at least to Elliot.
In Constantinople at the same time, in the hope of deterring the Turks, Mallet
pointedly warned Talaat Pasha that Admiral Kerr had hoisted his flag on
Averoff as C-in-C of the Greek Fleet and that if the Turkish fleet went out
into the Aegean it would be attacked and sunk. Only the news of Kerr’s
appointment surprised the otherwise imperturbable Turk.
Although Grey had asked the Russians to
consider joining in an attack on Turkey they already had enough on their hands:
the decisive Battle of the Masurian Lakes was about to begin, following the
Russian rout at Tannenburg. Not that things were decidedly better on the western
front: the dire strategic position in France, where the Battle of the Marne had
begun on 5 September, but whose outcome would be uncertain for some time, meant
that the receipt of Buchanan’s cable, in which the Russians threatened to ditch
Greece, threw Grey into despair. If the Germans won at the Marne, Italy might be
tempted out of neutrality and the French fleet ‘paralysed’; Grey did not ‘like
the prospect in the Mediterranean at all, unless there is some turn of the tide
in France.’
Churchill, convinced that Turkish neutrality was a sham, hoped to bolster both
Grey’s and Sazonov’s confidence: his method of doing so, however, was to propose
that Russian troops could be taken from a quiet front – Archangel, Vladivostock
or Port Arthur – and shipped to the Dardanelles. This would obviate the need for
Greek participation: ‘A good army of 50,000 men & sea-power,’ the First Lord
sanguinely maintained, ‘that is the end of the Turkish menace.’
Grey responded to this crazy scheme by showing Churchill that morning’s telegram
from Petrograd: the Russians had no help to give.
With the Entente Powers fully committed elsewhere the focus
for any allied action against Turkey once more became Greece. After the receipt
of Churchill’s cable on 4 September, instructing Kerr to submit a plan for an
attack, the following days would be crucial in deciding whether or not the
Greeks would participate in the war. Kerr’s earlier, ambitious, plan required
revision on the basis of the latest intelligence; immediately upon Kerr’s return
to Athens from the fleet, on Saturday 5th, he saw the King to seek his approval
to have the plan brought up to date.
Constantine also saw Venizelos on this Saturday to discuss the situation; both
were generally in agreement that, though a Turkish declaration of war would be
preferable, it would still be possible for Greece to launch an attack first as
long as the danger from Bulgaria could be circumvented. But here was the
divergence: Constantine wanted the terms of collaboration between Greece and the
Entente agreed in advance while, according to the King’s recollection, the Prime
Minister did not want ‘to bargain about our help, but simply trust to the
generosity of England.’ Sunday, as usual, was a day of rest for most of the
protagonists, in anticipation of the furious activity of Monday. The exception
was Foreign Minister Streit. His ‘provisional retention’ at the Foreign Ministry
following his attempted resignation in August was becoming ever more anomalous.
After the Prime Minister’s audience with the King the previous day, Venizelos
had informed Elliot that he would ‘very probably’ ask Streit to resign ‘within
forty-eight hours’. Streit knew the game was up and so, on Sunday, sat down to
compose a memorandum to be presented to the King and Venizelos the following
day, accompanied by his formal resignation.
The thrust of this document was to advise
against Greek involvement in a war with Turkey as, while intervention against
Turkey would solve the outstanding differences between the two countries, it
would result in no great territorial expansion for Greece. Further, Greek
intervention might provoke Bulgaria to attack Serbia and then turn on Greece —
though if Turkey entered the war against the Entente Bulgaria would probably
remain neutral to avoid a Greek and Roumanian attack. Streit also believed that
a Turkish or Bulgarian attack on Greece would attract only limited support from
the Entente. Overall, Streit’s outlook was guided by his belief that, if Greece
entered the war alongside the Entente, she had little to gain in the event of an
Entente victory while, with the (in his view) much more likely outcome being an
Austro-German victory, Greece had much to lose.
Streit submitted his memorandum to the King
on the morning of Monday 7 September, but to Venizelos only in the afternoon.
When Kerr saw the King again on Monday (after Constantine had received Streit’s
memorandum) to discuss the Dardanelles plan, Constantine initially intimated
that a main landing on the Asiatic shore would be preferable, then he went off
the record: no longer was he speaking to the C-in-C of his Navy, but to his old
friend. After his audience with the King, Kerr quickly made a note of their
conversation to show to Venizelos. Apparently unaware of their unofficial
nature, Kerr had treated the King’s opinions as policy: that Constantine did not
want to go to war unless first attacked by Turkey; that he wished to remain
neutral to avoid a complete break with the Kaiser; that he required an assurance
that the Entente would support Greece in the case of a Bulgarian attack after
Greece had been exhausted resisting a Turkish attack; that he disbelieved the
current intelligence which suggested the German presence in Turkey was directed
at Russia; and, finally, that he was averse to provoking Turkey as the Greek
people were tired of war.
The reaction of Venizelos to this can be
imagined and Kerr was doubtless being diplomatic when he stated that the Prime
Minister ‘desired me not to communicate it to my Government.’ Yet, despite this
request, Kerr nevertheless showed his notes to Elliot and drafted a telegram to
London. Venizelos obviously recognized that a reply by Kerr to Churchill based
on Kerr’s memorandum (made, one must assume, under the influence of Constantine
and Streit) would put an immediate stop to any idea of Greek participation.
Venizelos had but one last card to play, although it was one he was not averse
to using whenever it suited him — he submitted his resignation to Constantine:
By your Majesty’s instructions [he wrote the King on 7
September] Admiral Kerr has communicated to me the text of a telegram, drafted
by him on the basis of the conversation he had with your Majesty in reply to the
dispatch he received from the British Admiralty.
I asked the Admiral not to send this
telegram…before receiving fresh instructions from your Majesty, and I now
respectfully beg you to accept my resignation so that the complete harmony
between the Crown and the responsible Government that is essential at times so
critical for the Nation can be restored.
Greece could not take the offensive against Turkey, Venizelos
argued, without some form of assurance against Bulgaria, ‘But to declare that in
no case…would we be disposed to make war against Turkey before being attacked is
manifestly contrary to the well recognised interests of the Nation.’ Venizelos
argued that the war could be localized and there was no need to declare war
against the Central Powers but that, even if they did regard her as a
belligerent, Greece’s position – backed by Britain and France – would be too
strong. ‘I do not overlook the fact’, he continued, ‘that the condition I impose
on our active co-operation against Turkey, namely, the co-operation or the
assured neutrality of Bulgaria, is difficult of realization.’
Yet here was the fatal flaw in his argument: ‘difficult of realization’ should
have read ‘impossible of realization’, as Venizelos knew quite well by now that
Grey had shown no interest in guaranteeing such a condition. Indeed it is
tempting to suggest that only semantics separated the positions of the King and
the Prime Minister — though neither would admit it.
Constantine replied immediately to the Prime
Minister’s accusations and, in doing so, lobbed the ball firmly back into
Admiral Kerr’s court:
As I know the Admiral very well, [Constantine informed
Venizelos later that day] and we had in former times had somewhat intimate
conversations, I then spoke to him about the situation in general. He knows the
Emperor of Germany intimately, and, talking thus to a man who was acquainted
with the character of the Kaiser, I said that for my own part I would greatly
prefer that Turkey should attack us rather than that we should participate in a
war declaration on Turkey by the Entente, my reason being that I did not want to
put myself out of favour with the Kaiser for ever.
I even said, in the course of the
conversation (first of all pointing out that it was a question of policy to be
discussed between the English and Hellenic Governments, and in any case, did not
concern him) that if Bulgaria did not take part in the war, she would remain so
strong afterwards that she would find some pretext to attack us.
You will thus see, from the way this
conversation turned, that I made no communication to the Admiral that he could
telegraph to the Admiralty. I do not at all want to show indifference to the
Triple Entente, nor want of respect to Germany. I only desire the good of the
country and of the people over which I reign…
Expressing great surprise at Venizelos’ letter, Constantine
admitted ‘unreservedly’ that his Prime Minister’s arguments were irrefutable.
‘Furthermore’, the King added, ‘you had already developed them last Saturday
when I saw you…I think I told you and proved to you that I was in complete
agreement with you.’ What divided them was ‘a mere difference which ought not to
be called a disagreement.’ Constantine then mentioned that, knowing Kerr
intimately, he had talked to him about the general situation, but, as shown
above, had ‘made no communication to the Admiral that he could telegraph to the
Admiralty.’
Nevertheless, Venizelos was later to claim
that the King had done just the opposite: speaking in 1917, Venizelos purported
to reconstruct the conversation between the King and Kerr which took place on
Monday 7 September 1914. According to his version Venizelos alleged that he had
obtained the authorization of the King before making his sweeping declaration to
place all the naval and military forces of Greece at the disposal of the Entente
(‘always presupposing that we were to be guaranteed against the Bulgarian
danger’) but that Constantine had then, supposedly, changed his mind under the
influence of Streit and the General Staff, so that:
when as a direct result of our declaration the British
Admiralty instructed Admiral Kerr to come to an understanding with our General
Staff in order to study the possibility of attacking and work out plans for
occupying the peninsula of Gallipoli, King Constantine said to Admiral Kerr:
“Why all this? I have no intention of making war against Turkey. You know,” he
added, it is true, in his remarks to Admiral Kerr, “you know that Mr Venizelos
has spoken to me about this, and he feels very strongly about it; I agree with
him to this extent: if Turkey declares war against us, and if you want to help
us, I will accept your help”…Admiral Kerr was obliged to ask if the King would
allow him to communicate these remarks (to the British Government)…“I authorise
you,” the King replied, “to communicate them as my answer to your Government,
but please remember…that you must call and see the Prime Minister for him to
confirm your telegram, for this reply must not be sent without his approval...
Constantine was, of course, fully conversant with Streit’s
views and was unlikely, therefore, to have been unduly influenced by his
memorandum; for Venizelos, however, it represented the perfect opportunity to
claim that foreign policy was being formulated, without his approval, by Streit,
Constantine and Kerr. Yet, as the King made clear at the time to his petulant,
scheming Prime Minister:
You appear to me to believe that since Saturday, when I last
saw you, I have changed my views regarding the policy we should adopt and that I
have communicated my views to Admiral Kerr before discussing them with you.
Similarly, that I shared the contrary opinion of the Foreign Minister regarding
the line of conduct to follow in certain circumstances, and that I have
communicated this view to a third party before telling you. I have always
striven to be loyal and frank in my relations with my Ministers, with the Chief
of the Cabinet, and especially with M Venizelos.
Do you not think it would have been
sufficient to ask me whether the contents of Admiral Kerr’s telegram represented
my views? If I had answered such a question in the affirmative you could have
tendered your resignation, but in the present circumstances I see no grounds for
your resignation, which I do not accept.
As with all his threats of resignation,
Constantine was perfectly well aware of the difficulty of forming a Government
in the absence of Venizelos, a fact on which Venizelos himself was counting. All
such threats amounted, therefore, to a game of bluff and counter-bluff. This
time, however, as the King could not be bluffed, Venizelos determined to try a
similar experiment on Elliot; he would not have long to wait.
Entente representations had, in the meantime,
been made to the Bulgarian and Serbian Governments so that, provided Greece and
Serbia secured territorial expansion in the war, ‘adequate’ territorial
concessions would be granted to Bulgaria. When Elliot attempted to inform
Venizelos of this the Prime Minister became ‘excited’ and replied that if the
communication ‘had anything to do with concessions he would resign himself.’
Elliot, taking the threat more seriously than Constantine, decided to consult
Grey before presenting the communication: the Minister had ‘no doubt’ that
Venizelos ‘meant what he said’, and, he added earnestly, ‘I need not enlarge
upon unfortunate consequences which his resignation would have for us. He is in
a very nervous state from overwork and is only kept by patriotism from taking
rest.’
Grey comfortingly replied that the Powers were not contemplating, ‘in any case
for the present’, that Bulgaria should receive territorial concessions ‘as there
are signs that she will not depart from neutrality
and’, he ventured, somewhat optimistically, ‘may even perhaps gravitate towards
the three allies.’
Venizelos was informed, ‘very confidentially’, of Grey’s message; but though
this was a small victory for the Prime Minister he had, in effect, lost the war.
Admiral Kerr’s overly ambitious original plan for a
five-pronged attack went beyond the remit of Churchill’s instructions, which
required a simpler plan to be developed in conjunction with the General Staff.
The revised plan was ready by the morning of 9 September at which time Kerr
presented Elliot with a telegram to be forwarded to Churchill which would put
paid to any chance of immediate Greek participation:
Following from Admiral Kerr to Fist Lord of the Admiralty.
I have consulted with Greek General Staff on the subject of
your telegram.
They are of opinion, and I agree, that force at disposal of
Greece is sufficient to take Gallipoli if Bulgaria does not attack Greece. It
is not sufficient guarantee for Bulgaria to undertake to remain neutral. They
will not trust her unless she also attacks Turkey at the same time with all her
force. The plan for taking the Straits of the Dardanelles is ready if above
conditions obtain.
Greece has sufficient transports to convey
troops. Assistance of a British squadron of two battle-cruisers, one armoured
cruiser, three light cruisers and flotilla of destroyers and mine-sweepers will
be needed. This plan was originally made out by General Staff and myself without
outside assistance, but since Turkey has mobilised and obtained German ships
operation has become greater.
General Staff has alternative plan ready, but
it would require money from England to carry through. Enormous import trade of
cereals are sent to Germany by Bagdad Railway from Mesopotamia. This railway can
be seized at Alexandretta and position maintained by a very large force.
That, by so boldly stating the predicament, Kerr would go
further than Venizelos desired was to be expected; even so, the contents of the
telegram must have come as a profound shock in London. In the Foreign Office
opinion was united: George Clerk minuted simply, ‘The condition as regards
Bulgaria seems to me scarcely practicable’, while a weary Nicolson added,
‘Greece would have to offer Bulgaria something to join with her. I think M
Venizelos declines to do.’ Nicolson also queried whether the telegram should be
circulated; Grey, suspicious of Greek intentions and possibly relieved to be
clear of the whole Greek imbroglio, had the final say: ‘Certainly not.’
Kerr was later to write, disingenuously, that
the silence emanating from London after the receipt of his telegram was
‘curious’; that he was the man on the spot, ideally suited to plan and lead an
attack on the Dardanelles, yet no orders came to launch such an attack. On the
contrary, on the same day Churchill received Kerr’s report, the First Lord had
relieved Admiral Limpus from his invidious position in Constantinople and, with
the proposed assault in mind, planned to install him in command of the
Dardanelles Squadron in place of Troubridge.
However, with the Turks still not in the war, this appointment was considered
too provocative and was later rescinded; it is hard to envisage that Kerr’s
appointment – if ever seriously considered – would not have raised the same, or
even greater, difficulties. In any event, Kerr must have known that, by adding
the condition about Bulgaria, he had destroyed any chance of Greek involvement
and, for the time being, without the Greeks there would be no Dardanelles
campaign.
Venizelos went even further in his post-war
attempts to remove from his own shoulders the burden of Greece’s failure to
participate in the Gallipoli operations. He went so far as to deny knowledge of
the contents of Churchill’s telegram to Kerr, insisting that Kerr had told him
only that the Admiralty had merely ordered a study to be made in case of an
eventual attack on Gallipoli. Venizelos then continued in an “if only” vein
(which was to become a familiar litany for those tainted by the calamity of
Gallipoli):
Had I known the contents of the telegram [from Churchill]…I
would not have mentioned to the King the need for guaranteeing our security
against the Bulgarian danger. Since we would have undertaken and conducted the
operation against the Dardanelles in common with Great Britain (the rapid
success of which had been then considered guaranteed by our Staff itself)
Bulgaria would not think of attacking us, since only one Greek corps would
operate in Gallipoli and the other four corps would remain in Greece in order to
face an eventual Bulgarian attack.
This, of course, is arrant nonsense. As has already been
shown, Venizelos had pledged Greek troops to assist in the Dardanelles on 29
August
and had opined that Bulgaria could be bought off with the promise of Turkish
territory. Grey had informed Elliot on 4 September of Kerr’s instructions from
Churchill
and, when Elliot saw Venizelos the same day, he replied to Grey at 10.20 that
evening that he had ‘remarked to M Venizelos that if Greek Army mobilized in
order to co-operate with us something would have to be done to reassure Bulgaria
and he asked me to point out to you that Bulgarian mobilization would paralyse
action of Greek Army. He suggested that Bulgaria should be offered advantages at
the expense of Turkey to induce her to join us or at least maintain benevolent
neutrality.’
Could the Venizelos who admits here that the mere fact of Bulgarian mobilization
would paralyse the Greek army be the same one who, in the quotation above,
believes that, due to the presence of four army corps, the overwhelmingly strong
Bulgarian army would not dare attack Greece?
Further proof that the Prime Minister was
fully aware of the proposed Gallipoli operation before his meeting with the King
is provided once more by Elliot who saw Venizelos again on 5 September. The
Minister informed Grey after this meeting that Venizelos had estimated it would
take 20 days for the Greeks to mobilize which ‘includes concentration of troops
on the frontier’ although ‘their assembly at various ports for embarkation could
be effected in much less time.’
Finally, the King maintained that he learned of the contents of the
Admiralty telegram from Venizelos before being approached by Kerr on the
subject.
Greek participation had foundered, and with it hopes of an immediate assault on
the Dardanelles, on the rock of Bulgaria. There was little Grey could do if
Venizelos refused to believe Bulgarian protestations of neutrality. They, like
the Roumanians and Italians, were awaiting a clearer indication of the course of
the war before deciding which way to jump.
How serious was the threat that Bulgaria would intervene? The
prospect certainly seemed real when a draft treaty of Austro-Bulgarian alliance
was presented on 2 August to the Austrian and German representatives in Sofia
who then balked at the contents, which were simple yet far-reaching:
1. The Triplice will guarantee Bulgaria’s present territory
against attack from whatever side it may come.
2. The Triplice will give Bulgaria support in her
aspirations for future territorial acquisitions in regions in which she
possesses historic or ethnographical rights and which are under the dominion of
a State not belonging to the Triplice.
Although Germany was keen to have Bulgaria as an ally at
almost any price, the Austrians stalled. One theory is that, convinced of
victory against Serbia, the Austrians were disinclined to offer Bulgaria Serb
territory, or that, alternatively, the promise of concessions to a third party
would complicate any compromise peace between Austria and Serbia. Either way,
with Germany and Russia pressing for neutrality as the safest course in the
immediate future, and the irresolute Berchtold in Vienna swamped by the tide of
events, the spectre of the Bulgarian army marching on Greece which weighed so
heavily on the shoulders of Venizelos in 1914 was, in reality, a phantom. It
would be October 1915 before, in a further miscalculation, the Bulgarians nailed
their colours to the Central Powers’ mast and attacked Serbia.
Elliot had one last attempt on 10 September
to persuade Venizelos to offer some concession to Bulgaria other than Cavalla.
Churchill was later to argue that a wiser course would have been to give Cyprus
to Greece as a sop;
however, Venizelos remained intransigent and Elliot forlornly reported that he
‘refused to consider any of these proposals on military or other grounds.’
By 12 September the French and British had turned the Germans back from Paris, a
victory of sorts had been won, and the front line stabilized. This was enough to
renew the belief in London that Bulgaria would remain neutral and might even,
optimistically, gravitate towards the Entente — which must have been something
of a surprise to those in Athens clearly aware of the Austro-German influence in
Bulgaria. Nevertheless, relief at the outcome on the Marne led to the
postponement of any further attempts to bribe the Bulgarians. Aware now that the
critical moment at which to align his country with the Entente Powers had passed
him by, Venizelos bided his time, waiting for the inevitable rupture with
Turkey. However, Churchill, undeterred, made one last attempt to convince Grey:
‘I am very unhappy about our getting into war with Turkey without having Greece
as our ally’, he wrote the Foreign Secretary on 23 October adding, ‘This was the
least to be hoped for. Surely it is not too late.’
Unfortunately, for Venizelos in particular,
Bulgaria would continue to be a bogy. When, in 1915, he agreed finally to cede
Cavalla (conditionally) as a precursor to possible Greek participation against
Turkey it was only to see the Russians veto the use of Greek troops. Throughout,
Venizelos had attempted to use the putative threat posed by Bulgaria to extract
the maximum guarantee from the Entente to safeguard his flank, without the
necessity of having to bribe Bulgaria and risk a public outcry by offering
concessions of disputed Greek territory. Ultimately and ironically the Prime
Minister was hoist by his own petard; he admitted that his conditions for Greek
participation – the co-operation or assured neutrality of Bulgaria – were
‘difficult of realization’, but he gave no practical indication as to how it
would be possible to be assured of Bulgarian neutrality in all situations.
Therefore, although he refused to admit as such, co-operation alone became his
sine qua non.
Admiral Kerr, backed by the Greek General
Staff, also admitted the problem regarding neutrality (‘It is not sufficient
guarantee for Bulgaria to undertake to remain neutral’) but used stronger
language with regard to possible co-operation: the General Staff would not trust
Bulgaria ‘unless she also attacks Turkey at the same time [as Greece] with all
her forces.’ Kerr had called Venizelos’ bluff and the Prime Minister knew it.
Rendel, from the British Legation, put the problem concisely:
No means was found of at once effectively guaranteeing Greece
against Bulgarian attack and at the same time of maintaining sufficiently
friendly relations with Bulgaria to leave the door open for possible
co-operation on her part, and the question of Greek co-operation was practically
dropped.
The question remains, why did Kerr go further than
Constantine (apparently) and Venizelos (certainly) intended in his reply to
Churchill? Although Kerr did state, if somewhat bluntly, the actual Greek
position, Constantine denied – to Venizelos at least – giving him the authority
to do so, while Venizelos twice attempted to resign to prevent Kerr’s reply
being sent. Did Kerr simply misinterpret a friendly discussion with the King or
did he, with Constantine’s consent, try to pull the rug out from under Venizelos
by stating a condition he must have known would be rejected?
Kerr was to remain a thorn in Venizelos’ side for some time:
when the Prime Minister proposed, late in November 1914, that the fleet be
demobilized, Grey guessed that the real reason was to make Kerr’s position
untenable. Was there, Grey inquired innocently, any friction or dissatisfaction
with the Admiral?
Elliot confronted Venizelos and, as was the Minister’s wont, came away convinced
by the explanation proffered:
The reason given by M Venizelos for the demobilisation of the
Fleet was the true one [he replied to Grey]. He gave me to understand that he
was parting with his Minister of Marine on account of his extravagance. The
Treasury is empty and the present rate of expenditure cannot be kept up. The
military expenditure cannot be reduced, so he turned to the Navy, admitting
frankly that the Allied Squadrons off the Dardanelles are doing its work. I am
sure that he would not wish for any change in the Naval Mission. If there is
dissatisfaction, it is on the side of the Mission, which cannot make progress it
ought, owing to interested obstruction, and reactionary place-hunters, but the
Government and the best of the Officers are quite satisfied…
What was this ‘interested obstruction’ and who were these
‘reactionary place-hunters’ to which Elliot referred? This contrasts markedly
with Kerr’s comment that ‘during the whole time I was there, the [building]
programme was not only not carried out, but Mr Venizelos himself was the chief
obstructionist to its being fulfilled, and was also the cause why nearly all the
money for the Greek Naval Estimates was expended on two useless, worn-out, and
obsolete battleships [the American ships purchased in the summer of 1914] which
could neither steam nor effectively use their nearly worn-out guns.’
The final twist came in March 1915 when,
following the abortive Anglo-French attempt to force the Dardanelles by ships
alone, the question of Greek participation in the combined operations was raised
once more. Before the Russian veto was applied, Elliot telegraphed Grey that,
In likely event of Greece coming into the war it is desirable
immediately to define position of Admiral Kerr. At present only instructions are
telegram from First Lord of the Admiralty in Foreign Office telegram no. 170 of
September 4th. [Churchill’s order to prepare a plan of attack]. If Admiral Kerr
goes to sea probably Admiral Condouriotis will not, which is very desirable as
he is incompetent and difficult to deal with. Kerr is most anxious to fall in
with any arrangement to help the service and Admiral Carden [in command of the
Allied fleet off the Dardanelles]. His knowledge of the Dardanelles may be
useful. It must be remembered that Admiral Condouriotis being senior to Carden
would cause embarrassment and Kerr is quite willing to work under Carden. Would
British ship be at Kerr’s disposal in which to fly this [sic] flag as
previously arranged?
This telegram was sent to the Admiralty where it took some
time to locate a copy of Churchill’s orders of 4 September 1914 and, when a copy
was eventually found on 9 March, it resulted in the following minute: ‘First
Lord... No one in Admiralty appears to have seen it before.’
Churchill replied to Kerr the same day:
My telegram of September 4 is superseded by course of events.
If Greece comes into the War we should urge that you should command the Greek
ships working with our forces. You would of course in that event serve under
Admiral Carden. If the Greeks would be influenced to give you the sea going
command of their Fleet by your hoisting your flag in a British ship we will
place one at your disposal. Meanwhile remain at your post and do your utmost to
prepare the Greek Navy.
And there Kerr might have remained had not a bout of malaria
removed him from the undoubtedly difficult position he found himself in and
forced his return to London in the late summer of 1915 where, despite his
credentials, there was no offer forthcoming for his re-employment. Although, by
that time, Churchill was no longer at the Admiralty, it is difficult not to
imagine that in the general search for scapegoats following the Gallipoli fiasco
Kerr was tainted by virtue of his unhelpful reply to Churchill’s telegram of 4
September which virtually scuppered any chance of Greek involvement and an early
assault on the Dardanelles. And, though the full story of the Admiral’s highly
ambivalent performance during the escape of Goeben and Breslau was
yet to emerge, Battenberg (as has been shown) clearly believed that the Foreign
Office had begun a whispering campaign against Kerr. Still technically employed
by the Greeks, the prospect of his return to Athens filled them with alarm. As
the First Sea Lord made clear in January 1916: ‘Mark Kerr was to have started
[for Greece] on Monday [31 January] but was stopped at the last moment by the
Greek Govt. who preferred giving him 2 months’ full-pay leave to having him with
them.’
In desperation, having almost given up hope
of serving in the Navy during the War, Kerr sought (with Admiralty permission)
an interview with Sir William Robertson, the Chief of the General Staff, ‘with
the hopes of getting employment in the Army as a lieutenant or captain of a
company, or as a flying officer in the Royal Flying Corps.’
Battenberg also pleaded on Kerr’s behalf, writing to Admiral Hamilton:
As you probably know Mark Kerr is at last clear of the Greek
business. I am very glad, as I was responsible for sending him out there.
Needless to say he is eating his heart out at being unemployed while we are at
war. Opinions may differ as to his worth. With an experience ranging from 1st
Lieutenant to Flag Capt. I have a very high opinion of his worth as a Sea
Officer…I have recommended him generally to my successor in office, but I
hesitate to make any concrete proposals to the First Sea Lord — To you, as an
old friend, I should however like to submit an idea which has occurred to
me…Churchill & I decided to establish an aerial force (headquarters Dunkirk) for
the express purpose of destroying Zeppelins before they could cross the Channel
& attack us. I have no knowledge whatever as to what there is now in this force
(if it still exists), or who is in charge of it. Mark Kerr is a certified airman
and an experienced & skilful pilot…Were he put in charge of an adequate force
for conducting air raids from a continental base we should see great results.
Kerr’s eventual salvation came from an unlikely source:
Winston Churchill. Churchill, who had been serving in France, returned to London
early in March 1916 and decided to participate in the forthcoming naval debate
in the Commons. His speech was trenchant in its criticisms of Admiralty policy —
‘Not very patriotic of Churchill,’ Hankey recorded, ‘but he said a lot of true
things’
— however, the effect was completely overshadowed by his bizarre suggestion that
Fisher should be recalled as First Sea Lord.
Inevitably, the question of Churchill’s judgment was raised once more and,
equally inevitably, the subject of the Dardanelles.
Nevertheless, Churchill now determined that his immediate future lay in the
political arena and not in France and, the day after his speech, he asked
Kitchener to be relieved of his command.
This would take some time, and it was not until early May that Churchill
returned to London ready to begin combat of a different kind.
Before Churchill could seriously contemplate
a full return to mainstream political life he had first to lay to rest the ghost
of Gallipoli and this, he believed, could only be achieved by full publication
of the relevant documents relating to the origins of the campaign. It was not a
request likely to endear him to the Government. Coincidentally or not, and Kerr
certainly believed it was no coincidence,
the former head of the Greek Navy suddenly found himself offered the command of
the Adriatic Squadron, much to the chagrin of his fellow officers.
Meanwhile, Churchill continued in his demand for publication, which he hoped
would show that the decisions reached in January 1915 had been collective and
that Kitchener, for one, also bore a heavy measure of responsibility.
On 1 June it was announced in the Commons that documents would be laid before
Parliament as soon as possible. Unfortunately for Churchill, within days
Kitchener had been drowned and his reputation was thus saved, preserved in aspic
by a Government now unwilling publicly to criticize the man many of them
privately had come to regard as a liability.
‘Fortunate was he’, Churchill muttered, ‘in the moment of his death.’
By mid-June Asquith had decided against the publication of the minutes of the
War Council; by July that no documents at all would be published, citing
security grounds. But something had to be done and so it was no surprise that
Asquith went down that well trod path of politicians wishing to bury the past:
the inquiry. On 20 July Asquith announced that he would set up a Select
Committee ‘to inquire into the conduct of the Dardanelles’ operations.’ Kerr’s
presence would, for a variety of reasons, have been embarrassing to say the
least and it was extremely convenient that he was then all but forgotten in his
Adriatic backwater — out of reach of the probing questions of the Dardanelles
Commissioners. Judging by the following evidence, Churchill had just as much
reason as others to be grateful for Kerr’s absence:
q. 1115: And the military force which you first contemplated
was a Greek military force? Churchill: There was a moment when M
Venizelos offered the co-operation of Greece in a very sweeping manner. Whether
he could have carried it out I do not know.
q. 1116: Did you ask the Greeks for plans? Churchill:
Did I? No, I did not.
q. 1117: Did you have them offered? Churchill: I
have no knowledge of it. Of course, that is really a War Office matter. Let me
make it quite clear that I am seeking only to use those documents to prove the
fact that one was not so ignorant of the past study of this subject as to go for
a purely naval attack unless one was sure that there were no other practicable
means. More than that I do not seek to prove. The Foreign Office however thought
it necessary to decline the Greek offer at that time…
When Kerr returned home again on 31 August 1917, long after
the Dardanelles Commission, the Admiralty transferred him within two days to
assist in the formation of the Royal Air Force. Although Kerr subsequently
became Deputy Chief of the Air Staff ‘certain differences on matters of strategy
[as Kerr put it] with the Chief of the Air Staff made it advisable’ for him to
seek a lesser command in Salisbury, away from the intrigues and squabbles of
London.
This was not quite the view of his superiors: as the then First Lord noted in a
draft letter to the Secretary of State for the Royal Air Force, ‘it has been
found desirable to use the abilities of Rear-Admiral Mark Kerr in an important
Command elsewhere.’ Preferably as far away from Whitehall as possible.
After the war, when in correspondence with
the Historical Section of the Committee of Imperial Defence, Kerr believed he
had stumbled upon the beginnings of a cover-up:
I enclose you copies of such telegrams that I have got [he
answered a request from Captain Inglefield]. I believe that memory is short
lived, and probably most people will have forgotten that Mr Winston Churchill,
giving evidence…stated that he did not know that a Greek plan had ever been
asked for or offered. There are no copies of these telegrams to be found in
the Foreign Office or in the legation at Athens. Mr Churchill asked me for
my copies some time ago, but I wrote to the Foreign Office as I did not wish to
part with mine. It was then I found out that the Foreign Office copies had
vanished. I have refrained from publishing these telegrams for fear of stirring
up trouble which would not assist our country or empire…If by publishing them we
could repair the incalculable damage done by the infernal mess of the Gallipoli
Expedition, I would welcome sandwich men walking up and down with them all over
the Empire…
Later, in 1927, Kerr had a mild swipe at the
system of awarding honours and decorations: he had received the Order of the
Saviour (2nd Class) from the Greeks in June 1914 and, while in command of the
Adriatic Squadron, the decoration of St Maurice and St Lazarus from the
Italians, but no British honour was awarded him after 1913. In this, and his
various subsequent postings, his friendship with Constantine had cost him dear,
a fact which was not lost on Compton Mackenzie:
No consideration for his own career ever allowed him to abate
in the slightest degree his advocacy of the King’s case. It may be pointed out
that although after leaving Greece he was given the command of the Adriatic
Squadron and later became Deputy-Chief of the Air Staff, his last British honour
is the Companionship of the Bath given to him in 1913. I have never heard his
seamanship criticized, so that political indiscretion must presumably be the
reason for this conspicuous neglect to recognize his services.
It
seems clear that, having finally decided upon a course of action, Kerr would not
deviate; easily influenced initially he also possessed, in greater measure than
average, a capacity for self-deception — Kerr could convince himself of
anything. As a corollary to this was a predisposition, evident throughout his
career, to an exaggerated appraisal of his own opinions. For example, it was
Kerr who, allegedly, first evolved a theory to explain the almost mystifying
collision that overtook Admiral Tryon in Victoria in the Mediterranean in
1891,
which was then used by other writers, most notably Oscar Parkes.
In October 1911 Kerr wrote an article on Trafalgar for The Nineteenth Century
and After which, according to him, dispelled forever the erroneous idea as
to how the battle was fought.
Elsewhere, this article – written to refute the theory of Sir Julian Corbett –
has been termed less than impressive.
On 11 October 1917 Kerr presented a memorandum to the President of the Air Board
which, he claimed, was known at the Air Board simply as ‘The Bomb Shell’
and proved influential in setting up an Air Ministry; this claim is derided by
Captain Roskill as ‘a considerable exaggeration’.
Is it not plausible therefore that, for a few crucial days early in August 1914,
an impressionable, egotistical officer who suddenly found himself in possession
of vital information which could affect the course of the war, might not have
taken it upon himself to decide how that information was to be used? What other
explanation is there for Kerr to have kept his silence when, if not by 4 August
certainly by the 7th, he must have known that Souchon was heading for the
Dardanelles? Having been convinced by the King that neutrality was the only
course open to Greece, Kerr could have reasoned that, with the German ships
safely through the Straits, the possibility of Greece now attacking Turkey was
out of the question. Unable to attack Turkey, worried always about Bulgaria, the
only option available then was neutrality. Similarly, why send a reply to
Churchill’s telegram of 4 September which he must have known could only have
resulted in Greek participation in the projected Dardanelles campaign being
declined?
Kerr had decided that he owed a greater
loyalty to the Greeks than to his own service and his own country. In coming to
this momentous decision it must always be borne in mind that, at the time, Kerr
could not have imagined the fateful consequences of his action. Yet, although
Souchon’s squadron should, by rights, have been interned, Greek intelligence
must have left Kerr in no doubt that the predominating influence at the Porte
was German and that, therefore, the Turks would probably make use of their
unexpected gift if, as seemed likely, the Ottoman Empire soon entered the war.
What he could not have been expected was that the Turks would show a marked
reluctance to enter the lists until forced to do so by Souchon and the guns of
Goeben, with the connivance of the rabidly pro-German Turkish War
Minister, Enver Pasha. If the Turks could have held out for a few more weeks, by
which time a stalemate had developed on the Western Front, the Serbs were
pushing back the Austrians, and, following Coronel, the last serious German
naval threat outside the North Sea had been removed, even Enver might have
thought twice before committing his country to a conflict where an assured
victory for the Central Powers was no longer guaranteed. For this, Kerr bears a
heavy responsibility.
The irony is that, for a number of different
reasons, Venizelos also desired that the German ships should escape. Again, no
other interpretation of his action in allowing the Bogados to sail with
her precious cargo is tenable. Venizelos also knew Souchon’s destination and
kept quiet about it. Once at their destination, the German ships, he could have
reasoned, would have precipitated a quick breach between Turkey and her
neighbours under the influence of Turkey’s German allies. With Turkey in the war
it would have made sense for the Entente, as they planned, to seek active Greek
participation. Venizelos could then name his terms, not least of which would be
the fulfilment of long-standing Greek aspirations to large slices of the Ottoman
Empire. What Venizelos did not count on, what robbed him of his glorious goal,
was the reluctance of the Turks to enter the lists. By the time the Turks were
forced into the war by Souchon and Enver Pasha Venizelos had lost his chance to
march, hand-in-hand, with the Entente Powers. |